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Vaccines and the Law
Michael Sanzo, Ph.D.*
I. BACKGROUND
In the early part of the eighteenth century, Dr. Zabdiel Boylston
inoculated his son and 246 of his neighbors with an extract prepared
from the pustules of deceased smallpox victims.' When six of the
vaccinees died, Boylston was vilified by his medical colleagues. Later,
a smallpox epidemic swept the community killing one out of every
seven people. Among the survivors were all 241 of Boylston's
patients.
The procedure used by Boylston, variolation, had been known for
over 2000 years and consisted of introducing live smallpox virus into
healthy individuals.2 George Washington ordered that this procedure
be used to immunize the Continental Army in 1777 and as a result,
the incidence of smallpox among soldiers dropped dramatically dur-
ing the final years of the American Revolution. 3
Edward Jenner, an Englishman, introduced a less dangerous im-
munization procedure in 1796.4 On May 14 of that year, Jenner inoc-
ulated an eight-year-old boy with material from cowpox lesions taken
from the hand of a milkmaid. On July 1, Jenner again inoculated the
boy, this time with live smallpox virus. No disease developed thus es-
tablishing the efficacy of Jenner's technique.5 By 1808, the first
state-supported facility for vaccination appeared in England, and by
the mid-1800s, nearly all physicians recognized the value of
immunization.6
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Today, vaccination is recognized throughout the world as having
contributed more to public health than any other medical procedure. 7
At the time the polio vaccine was first introduced in the United
States, greater than 20,000 new cases of paralytic polio were reported
annually.8 Today, there are less than ten. Similar results have been
obtained with vaccines for measles, mumps, rubella, diphtheria, per-
tussis and tetanus.9 On a worldwide scale, one of the greatest
achievements in medical history came in 1980 when the World
Health Organization announced the total eradication of smallpox.10
With such an impressive history of medical success, it might be ex-
pected that American manufacturers would be actively competing in
the production of commonly administered vaccines and vigorously de-
veloping new products. In fact, this is not the case, and the reasons
are legal rather than medical.I I This paper examines the profound
effect that the law has had on vaccination and the vaccine industry in
the United States.
II. INFLUENCE OF THE LAW ON VACCINATION AND THE VACCINE
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES - AN OVERVIEW
The law has influenced vaccination in the United States in three
distinct ways. During the early part of the twentieth century, states
passed compulsory immunization laws, which had the effect of pro-
moting not only public health, but also a thriving vaccine industry.12
All fifty states have enacted laws requiring that children be immu-
nized before entering school causing gross income from vaccine sales
to grow to between 500 and 600 million dollars annually.13
Beginning in the 1970s, a second and more destructive aspect of the
law began to influence the vaccine industry. Products liability law-
suits and punitive damages awards increased the risk associated with
tlejohn, Innovation on Tria" Punitive Damages Versus New Products, 246 SCIENCE
1395 (1989).
7. Huber, Will the New Vaccine Statute Give a Shot in the Arm to Tort Reform,
LEGAL TIMES, March 9, 1987, at 9; See also H.J. PARISH, VICTORY WITH VACCINES 207-16
(1968); Plotkin & Plotkin, A Short History of Vaccination, VACCINES 1-7 (S. Plotkin &
E. Mortimer, Jr. ed. 1988).
8. Hinman, Public Health Considerations, Vaccines 587, 595 (S. Plotkin & E.
Mortimer, Jr. ed. 1988).
9. Id.
10. Decisions of the Health Assembly: Declaration of Global Smallpox Eradication,
34 WORLD HEALTH 258 (1980).
11. Early, Can Biotechnology Immunize Vaccine Manufacturers from the Product
Liability Crisis?, 30 JuRIMETmiCS 351 (1990); DIVISION OF HEALTH PROMOTION AND DIS-
EASE PREVENTION, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 53
(1985) [hereinafter VACCINE SUPPLY].
12. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 32-33 (1905) (citing cases upholding
mandatory vaccination laws in seven states).
13. Goldbaum & Hunter, A Big Shot in the Arm, CHEMICAL WEEK, Mar. 22, 1989,
at 13.
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the production of vaccines.' 4 As a result, all but two American man-
ufacturers have been driven out of the market, and four of the seven
compulsory childhood vaccines are being made by a single supplier.iS
Recently, Congress has attempted to offset the destructive effect of
products liability by establishing a federal compensation program for
people injured as a result of having received one of the compulsory
vaccines. 16 The program was established by the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act in recognition of the fact that the country was
dangerously close to losing certain vaccines entirely.17
As can be seen from the discussion above, the law has played a cen-
tral role in the development and demise of the American vaccine in-
dustry as well as in attempts to revitalize it. The sections that follow
will examine aspects of the law that have importance to vaccination
and the vaccine industry.
III. STATE COMPELLED MEDICAL TREATMENT AND MANDATORY
IMMUNIZATION
A. Compulsory Vaccination
The law has addressed the states' power to compel its citizens to
undergo medical treatment in a number of different contexts. Laws
dealing with involuntary vaccination, involuntary sterilization and in-
voluntary treatment of patients whose religious beliefs preclude con-
ventional medical therapies have received the most attention.'8 Of
these, laws authorizing mandatory vaccination have been the least
controversial. The Supreme Court first considered such laws in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,'9 which upheld the constitutionality of a
law that made smallpox vaccinations mandatory in the city of Cam-
bridge.2 0 The Court stated that:
T]he police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reason-
able regulation established directly by legislative enactment as will protect
public health and safety.... mhe liberty secured by the Constitution of the
United States does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all
14. VACCINE SUPPLY, suspra note 11, at 53.
15. Id. at 5-11 (discussing these seven vaccines: polio, measles, mumps, rubella,
diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus).
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -33 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4-5 (1986).
17. H.R. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Seass. 4-5 (1986).
18. Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72
GEO. L.J. 1725 (1984); Litman, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the
Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1720 (1982).
19. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
20. Id, at 39.
times, and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.... Upon the
principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity a community has the right to
protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its
members.
2 1
Later in its opinion the Court emphasized that arbitrary or oppres-
sive laws would not be upheld.22 Thus, a law requiring the immuni-
zation of people who have a disproportionately high risk of injury
would be invalid.
The Court reaffirmed this position on compulsory vaccination in
192223 and, since, has favorably cited Jacobson many times.2 4 The
power of the state to mandate vaccination has been uniformly as-
serted in lower federal courts2 5 and in state courts throughout the
country.2
6
The uniform holdings in these cases may be attributable to the
similarity of the facts presented.2 7 For example, in all of these cases,
the vaccine in question targeted a highly contagious disease affecting
all segments of the population. The vast majority of the cases dealt
with the compulsory immunization of children as a prerequisite for
entering school. Insight into how the Court might act in other cir-
cumstances may be gained by examining the Court's position on com-
pulsory sterilization and the compulsory treatment of patients who
oppose medical treatment on religious grounds.
21. 1d& at 25-27.
22. Id, at 38.
23. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
24. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660
(1988); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Bates
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
25. See, e.g., Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Collura, 139 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1943); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 488 F. Supp. 433
(W.D. La. 1980); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (Mass. 1979); Jehovah's Witnesses v.
King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967); Gillin v. Board of
Public Ed., 250 F. 649 (E.D. Pa. 1918).
26. See, e.g., Niemiera v. Schneider, 114 N.J. 550, 555 A.2d 1112 (1989); Brown v.
Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964);
People v. Lavac, 357 Ill. 554, 192 N.E. 568 (1934); Commonwealth v. Childs, 299 Mass.
367, 12 N.E.2d 814 (1938).
27. State courts have differed with respect to statutes that grant exemption from
compulsory vaccination on religious grounds. The question arises as to whether ex-
empting only recognized religions violates the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
has held that there is no requirement for states to grant exemptions to people who
oppose vaccination merely for secular reasons. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Nevertheless, states have expressed different views on what constitutes a religious be-
lief as opposed to a secular belief. Compare Syska v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ.,
45 Md. App. 626, 415 A.2d 301 (1979) (holding that mandatory vaccination of school
children did not violate rights of a mother who had philosophical objections to vaccina-
tion even though religious objections were exempted) with Dalli v. Board of Educ., 267
N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971) (holding a similar statute which exempted religious but not
non-religious objections to vaccination).
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B. Compulsory Sterilization
The state's power to compel the sterilization of mentally retarded
patients was sustained in the 1927 decision of Buck v. Bell.28 It is im-
portant to note that the decision did not depend on the operation be-
ing of benefit to the patient; the sterilization was justified on the
basis of its benefit to society alone. The court noted:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
of its citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those
who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not
felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped
with incompetence. It is better for all the world if instead of waiting to exe-
cute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
the cutting of fallopian tubes.2 9
Although Buck has never been formally overruled, in 1942, the
Court struck down an Oklahoma law which sanctioned the involun-
tary sterilization of habitual criminals.30 Commentators have re-
cently referred to the Buck decision as "an aberration in [the
Supreme] Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence."3' It appears
that the Court's present position is that compulsory sterilization can
still be constitutionally enforced by a state, but only in cases where
there is a clear benefit to both society and the patient.3 2
C. Compulsory Treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian
Scientists
Blood transfusions and certain medical treatments violate the reli-
gious beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists. 3 3 Hos-
pitals faced with patients whose refusal of treatment has imperiled
their own lives or the lives of their children have often sought judi-
cial authority to compel therapy. When the patient is a minor, courts
have consistently authorized treatment despite objections of par-
28. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
29. Id. at 207 (citing Jacobson v. Massachussetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
30. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
31. Brief for the American College of Physicians as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 16 n.7, Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990) (No. 88-1503).
32. See generally Skinner, 316 U.S. 535; Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2841.
33. See, e.g., Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971) (involving a Christian Sci-
entist); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967),
aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Mercy Hosp., Inc. V'. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130
(1985) (involving a Jehovah's Witness).
ents.34 In Prince v. Massachusetts,35 the Supreme Court stated that
the right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose
the community to communicable disease or the child to ill health or
death. "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow they are free in identical circumstances to make mar-
tyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and
legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves." 36
More recently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,37 the Court reaffirmed in
dicta its willingness to abrogate parental religious convictions when
such beliefs jeopardize the well being of minors.38 Lower courts have
not generally interpreted the abridgment of rights to require a medi-
cal emergency. It is enough that a child is in pain 39 or that a malady
is interfering with his education.40
The Supreme Court has not yet examined a case involving a state's
ability to compel medical treatment when the life of an adult is im-
periled. Lower courts in different jurisdictions have ruled both for 4'
and against 42 state power. In general, adults have been allowed to re-
fuse treatment on religious grounds even when the decision jeopar-
dizes their lives.43 However, courts carefully weigh the effect that a
patient's death would have on others." For example, a determining
factor might be the amount of family and financial support available
to the children of the patient.45
Cases involving the compulsory medical treatment of adult Jeho-
vah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists may be distinguished from
those involving the compulsory vaccination of adults in that refusal
of the former only involves risk to the individual, while refusal of
vaccination puts society at risk.
34. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
35. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
36. Prince, 321 U.S. at 169.
37. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
38. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
39. In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
40. In re Samson, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972).
41. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971);
Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
42. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Osborne, 294
A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1962).
43. See generally McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law:
Jehovah's Witnesses in the Supreme Court, 55 CIN. L. REV. 997 (1987).
44. See Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), va-
cated as moot, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986).
45. Compare In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (mother of
seven-month-old child) with In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (father of two
children).
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D. Conclusions
Today, the State may compel medical treatment only in situations
where both society and the patient will benefit. Moreover, the inter-
est of society must be compelling in order to justify forced treat-
ment.4 6 Where the well-being of minors is at issue, courts have been
nearly uniform in finding for the state.47
With regard to adults, the law has been more deferential. If refus-
ing treatment results only in harm to the patient, courts generally ac-
cede to his wishes.48 However, if refusing treatment affects others in
the community, courts will balance the interests of society against
those of the individual and may approve involuntary medical
intervention.49
Applying these principles to vaccination, it is clear that vaccines di-
rected at highly contagious diseases affecting all members of the pop-
ulation may be made compulsory. In contrast, a vaccine directed
against a disease such as AIDS may not be legally compelled because
the vast majority of the population is not at risk for the disease.
A more difficult question is whether the state can compel the vac-
cination of those segments of the population most likely to contract
AIDS (e.g., individuals convicted of using intravenous drugs). In view
of the case law considered above, it appears that vaccination can be
made mandatory only when the interest of the community is compel-
ling and those receiving the vaccine would be benefitted. However,
laws making vaccination mandatory under such circumstances may
raise constitutional due process and equal protection questions which
have not yet been addressed by the courts.
46. For a discussion of possible state interests justifying mandatory medical treat-
ment, see Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Sackewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977).
47. One exception occurred in In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
The court denied a petition by the county health department to have surgery per-
formed on a 14-year-old boy with a cleft palate and a harelip. There were a number of
special factors which contributed to this decision. First, the boy's condition posed no
immediate threat to his life or well being. Second, the boy shared his father's belief in
self-healing and had a fear of surgery so pronounced that compelling treatment might
result in psychological harm. Finally, the boy's progress after surgery would depend
upon his cooperating in speech therapy. The court thought that it would be better to
postpone surgery in the hope that the boy's attitude toward the operation would be-
come more favorable and that he would become more amenable to post-operation
treatment.
48. See McAninch, supra note 43.
49. See Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985).
IV. THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CRISIS AND VACCINES
A. Strict Liability and Standards of Manufacturer Conduct
Under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
manufacturer of a defective product is strictly liable for injuries
caused by the defect.50 Liability may be imposed even though a man-
ufacturer has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of the product.5 ' Although strict liability is the standard applied to
most products, certain exceptions have been recognized. According
to section 402A, comment k:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use ....
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies
.... Such a product, if properly prepared, and accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. 52
On its face, comment k would appear to set a standard for vaccines,
which, in the context of products liability, is unusually deferential to
manufacturers. A manufacturer is protected from liability for the in-
herent dangers of his product unless he has been negligent either in
his method of preparation or in failing to supply adequate warnings.
Unfortunately for manufacturers, what constitutes a properly pre-
pared product and an adequate warning is subject to many different
interpretations.53 As may be seen in the material which follows,
some courts have adopted standards which are virtually impossible
for manufacturers to meet and which, in effect, impose absolute lia-
bility upon them for injuries caused by vaccines.
1. Adequate Warning - The Davis, Reyes and Givens Decisions
Perhaps the most common claim made by plaintiffs in products lia-
bility cases is that a manufacturer has failed to provide an adequate
warning concerning the possible consequences of using the product.5 4
With regard to immunization, most jurisdictions have adopted the
"learned intermediary" rule under which a prescription drug manu-
facturer may fulfill his duty to warn by providing appropriate infor-
mation to the health care worker performing the vaccination. 55
Unfortunately, not all courts have followed suit.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
51. See, e.g., Gravis v. Parke Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
53. Maedgen & McCall, A Survey of Law Regarding the Liability of Manufactur-
ers and Sellers of Drug Products and Medical Devices, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395 (1986).
54. Id.
55. For a discussion of the learned intermediary rule, see Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten,
520 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). For examples of the rule's application in differ-
ent jurisdictions, see annotation, Liability of Manufacturers of Oral Live Polio (Sabin)
Vaccine for Injury or Death From Its Administration, 66 A.L.R.4TH 83 (1988); Annota-
tion, Product Liability: Pertussis Vaccine Manufacturers, 57 A.L.R.4TH 911 (1987).
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The first indication that some courts might require that warnings
be given directly to patients came in 1968. In Davis v. Wyeth Labora-
tories,56 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a manufacturer
has a duty to warn patients directly when vaccinations are performed
at mass immunization clinics.
Here, however, although the drug was denominated a prescription drug, it was
not dispensed as such. It was dispensed to all comers at mass clinics without
an individualized balancing... of the risks involved. In such cases (as in the
case of over-the-counter sales of nonprescription drugs) warning by the manu-
facturer to its immediate purchaser li.e., the physician or other health care
provider] will not suffice .... [J]ust as the responsibility of choice is not one
that the manufacturer can assume for all comers, neither is it one that he can
allow his immediate purchaser to assume. In such cases, then, it is the respon-
sibility of the manufacturer to see that warnings reach the consumer .... 57
The manufacturer included a package insert with the vaccine, but the
clinic, where inoculation occurred, failed to convey the warnings con-
tained in the insert to Davis.58 Even though there was nothing in the
record to indicate negligence, and the court conceded that there had
been "scrupulous attention in the matter of preparation and testing,"
the court held the manufacturer liable.59
The Fifth Circuit adopted the view that manufacturers must warn
patients directly in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories.60 In Reyes, a child
contracted polio after being given the Sabin vaccine at a public health
clinic. The manufacturer had enclosed a package insert, and
although the administering nurse read the warning, she failed to con-
vey its information to the parents of the child.61 The court held that,
even with compulsory immunization under state law, a warning was
necessary because the two available polio vaccines (the Salk and Sa-
bin types) differed in their risk of adverse reactions.62
In Givens v. Lederle Laboratories,6 3 the Fifth Circuit considered a
case in which a mother contracted polio subsequent to her child's
vaccination.6 4 Unlike Davis and Reyes, the physician who failed to
56. 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968).
57. Id, at 131.
58. Id, at 125.
59. Id, at 126.
60. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. Id, at 1270.
62. Id, at 1293-94. The court was responding to an argument, set forth in an ami-
cus brief from the American Academy of Pediatrics, that a duty to warn patients
serves no purpose when vaccination is compulsory. Id, For an example of a decision
holding that compulsory immunization laws afford no protection to manufacturers of
vaccines, see Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr.
700 (1986).
63. 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977).
64. 1&
convey the warnings contained in the manufacturer's insert to the
mother of the vaccinated child, was in private practice.6 5 In spite of
the presence of the patient's personal physician, and the absence of
any claim that the vaccine was defective, the manufacturer was
found to be liable.66
The Givens decision represents a serious departure from the
"learned intermediary" principle with regard to vaccines adminis-
tered without a prescription and, if adopted by other jurisdictions,
would substantially increase the number of lawsuits against manufac-
turers. This holding alone constituted a major setback for vaccine
producers. However, the court went further, stating that even if the
package insert had been supplied directly to the patient, the manu-
facturer still would have been liable because the warning was inade-
quate.67 The insert stated that there had been reports of individuals
in close contact with vaccine recipients having developed polio, but
only in less than one in three million vaccinations. The FDA's Divi-
sion of Biological Standards, had approved this warning and its accu-
racy was not disputed.68 Nevertheless, the court declared the
warning insufficient, because in the subjective view of the adminis-
tering physician, the label suggested that the vaccine was safe.69
The predicament of manufacturers after the Davis, Reyes and Giv-
ens decisions is readily apparent. In order to fully meet their duty to
warn in all jurisdictions in the United States, manufacturers must di-
rectly inform patients of the risks associated with vaccines. To fulfill
this duty, manufacturers are completely dependent upon the health
care workers who administer their product. Thus, a manufacturer
could be found liable due solely to the negligence of one of these
workers. Even if vaccine producers could insure that these workers
would convey warnings to patients, it is not at all clear what sort of
warning would be considered adequate in every jurisdiction. The de-
cisions in the cases above suggest that neither reciting statistics of the
likelihood of an adverse reaction occurring, nor FDA approval of the
content of a warning, is sufficient.70 In effect, manufacturers are left
with little or no power to prevent potentially disastrous liability.
2. Properly Prepared Vaccines - Design Defects
Some courts have taken a position concerning proper vaccine prep-
aration that has added to the potential liability faced by manufactur-
65. Id. at 1346.
66. Id, at 1345.
67. Id.
68. The fact that the FDA had approved the warning was brought out in a later
case, Fraley v. American Cyanamid Co., 570 F. Supp. 497, 504 (D. Colo. 1983).
69. Givens, 556 F.2d at 1345.
70. Fraley, 570 F. Supp. at 504. See also Davis, 399 F.2d at 130.
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ers. In Toner v. Lederle Laboratories,71 the court held that a
manufacturer was liable for injuries resulting from the use of his
product because a safer vaccine could have been used.72 The plain-
tiffs were awarded 1.3 million dollars in spite of the fact that the al-
legedly safer vaccine had been taken off the market because of
concerns voiced by the FDA over its efficacy.
FDA certification represents only the FDA's opinion, albeit an informed one,
of the safety and efficacy of the drug .... We hold that FDA certification of a
drug is evidence but not conclusive evidence of the drug manufacturer's rea-
sonableness; the trier of fact may assign FDA approval the weight it
deserves.
7 3
Presumably, had the less efficacious yet safer vaccine been admin-
istered, and the vaccinee had later developed the disease, the manu-
facturer also would have been liable for knowingly selling a product
whose ability to confer immunity had been called into question.
It appears that the court in Toner was less concerned with evaluat-
ing the conduct of the manufacturer than insuring that the plaintiffs
received compensation for their injuries. The court in Reyes supplied
a justification for this attitude. After acknowledging that vaccine-in-
duced polio was unavoidable, the court said: "[A] strong argument
can be advanced that the loss ought not lie where it falls (on the vic-
tim), but should be borne by the manufacturer as a foreseeable cost
of doing business, and passed on to the public in the form of a price
increase to customers."74 The Reyes and Toner courts failed to appre-
ciate that manufacturers, faced with absolute liability, conflicting
views concerning their responsibilities, and huge damage awards,
might simply stop making vaccines entirely.
B. Causation
The risk to vaccine manufacturers has also been increased by the
acceptance of relaxed standards for the establishment of causation by
plaintiffs.75 Juries have generally not questioned whether vaccina-
71. 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987).
72. I&
73. Id, at 342 n.12, 732 P.2d at 311 n.12. In a concurring opinion, Justice Hanley
elaborated: "Perhaps the reason that no state has done so [permitted a showing of com-
pliance with FDA regulations to shield a manufacturer from liability] is that no state
supreme court has yet become convinced that the FDA has either adequate staffing,
expertise, or data base to warrant its being substituted for the judicial system." Id at
344, 732 P.2d at 313 (Hanley, J., concurring).
74. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1294.
75. For a discussion of changing standards in product liability cases, P. HUBER, LI-
ABILrrY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 98-113 (1988) [hereinafter P.
HUBER].
tion was the proximate cause of the injury where plaintiffs are in-
jured soon after being inoculated, and the injury was known as one of
the adverse effects associated with the vaccine. For example, the
jury in Reyes assumed that the plaintiff developed polio from vacci-
nation in spite of the existence of a polio epidemic in the area at the
same time he was inoculated.76 This kind of casual attitude toward
causation is disturbing.
Each year, a statistically predictable portion of the population is se-
riously injured by infections and a variety of diseases. Each year,
millions of people are vaccinated. The fact that these two events oc-
casionally occur in the same individual and in close temporal proxim-
ity does not establish a causal connection. 77 Courts should look more
carefully into the circumstances surrounding the injury and consider
the possibility that it was not caused by the vaccine. Closest atten-
tion should be paid to situations where there is good reason to think
that a plaintiff's injury may have occurred independently of his
vaccination.
Courts have also helped plaintiffs by relieving them of the burden
of proving that they would have refused immunization had they been
properly warned. For example, the court in Reyes held that:
Where a consumer, whose injury the manufacturer should have reasonably
foreseen, is injured by a product sold without a required warning, a rebuttable
presumption will arise that the consumer would have read any warning pro-
vided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize the risks. In the ab-
sence of evidence rebutting the presumption, a jury finding that the
defendant's product was the producing cause of the plaintiff's injury would be
sufficient to hold him liable.
7
a
C. Punitive Damages
A final factor which has aggravated manufacturer uncertainty over
potential liability has been the dramatic increase in awards of puni-
tive damages. 79 Prior to 1976, punitive damages in products liability
cases in the United States were almost unknown.8 0 This has changed
dramatically, especially with regard to suits brought against pharma-
ceutical manufacturers. Punitive damages were awarded in thirty-
five pharmaceutical products liability cases from 1985 to 1989 while
only six such awards were made in the 1970s.81
76. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1274.
77. For a discussion of the error of assuming that injury and drug administration
are causally connected rather than independent events, see P. HUBER, supra note 75, at
100-05 (1988).
78. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1294.
79. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 6.
80. Bittle, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment" An Analytical Frame-
work for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1433 (1987).
81. Brief for the Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n, Browning Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Dis-
posal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1990) (No. 88-556).
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Paralleling the increase in the number of awards has been a dra-
matic increase in their size. Prior to 1959, the highest punitive dam-
ages award for all types of actions granted in California was $10,000.82
This jumped to $250,000 in the 1960s and to $740,000 in the 1970s.83
By the end of 1988, the California Court of Appeals had approved
awards of greater than fourteen million dollars.84
The general trend of escalating punitive damages awards has been
reflected in those made to plaintiffs injured by vaccines. For exam-
ple, in Johnson v. American Cyanamid Company,8 5 a plaintiff who
had been injured as a result of having received an inoculation of the
Sabin polio vaccine was awarded two million dollars in actual dam-
ages and eight million dollars in punitive damages.86 This award was
given in spite of the fact that the manufacturer had fully complied
with all of the requirements of the FDA.s 7
Although the number of cases where punitive damages are
awarded is small relative to the number of lawsuits filed, the threat
of such awards has coerced manufacturers into paying higher
amounts in out-of-court settlements.86 Not surprisingly, insurance
costs to manufacturers have soared.89 It has been estimated that 95%
of the sale price of vaccines is attributable to products liability.90 The
price of vaccines has skyrocketed as a direct result of both the in-
creased costs generated by products liability lawsuits and fears that
the trend may continue. For example, the price of the DPT vaccine
increased from ten cents per dose in 1982 to more than three dollars
per dose in 1986.91 By 1988, the price had increased to more than
eleven dollars per dose.92
82. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 6, at 1396.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), off'd, Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co.,
243 Kan. 291, 758 P.2d 206 (1988).
86. Id. at 280, 718 P.2d at 1320. The decision was subsequently set aside by the
Kansas Supreme Court in a narrow 4 to 3 decision. Nevertheless, the case illustrates
the willingness of some courts to impose extremely large punitive damages upon vac-
cine manufacturers. A reversal sustained by the margin of a single vote could not be
terribly reassuring to the vaccine industry.
87. Id. at 284, 718 P.2d at 1326.
88. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 6. Among all types of actions, punitive
damages awards in product liability cases are the least likely to be reduced on appeal.
89. Marwick, Pediatric Vaccine Tax Seeks to Cover Injury, Not All Manufacturers
Passing on Increase, 259 J.A.M.A. 1292 (1989).
90. P. HUBER, supra note 75, at 155-61.
91. Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for
the DPT Controversy, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 855 (1988).
92. See Marwick, supra note 89, at 1292.
D. Effects on New Product Development
Perhaps the greatest impact that the products liability revolution
has had on pharmaceuticals is in the area of new product develop-
ment.93 In the case of vaccines that have been on the market for
many years, the courts have created uncertainties concerning poten-
tial liability. The risks inherent in the vaccines have been well estab-
lished.94 This is not true for new vaccines. Although testing will
provide information regarding safety, a manufacturer must, of neces-
sity, extrapolate from a very small population to a very large one.
When complications may occur at a rate of only one in 100,000, the
true effects of a vaccine only become apparent after a massive pro-
gram has been initiated. The resulting liability could be devastating.
This point may be illustrated by considering the swine flu vaccination
program.
In January of 1976, several soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey be-
came ill and one soldier died.95 The causative agent was identified as
a strain of influenza virus, which had been responsible for a mam-
moth epidemic in 1918.96 As a result, Congress committed itself to a
program of immunizing "every man, woman and child" in the United
States.97
Pressed by a desire to complete immunizations before the ap-
proaching flu season arrived, and faced with manufacturers reluctant
to produce the vaccine for fear of products liability, Congress quickly
passed the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 Act.98
Under this Act, manufacturers were immunized from liability; all
lawsuits were to be brought against the United States Government.99
The vaccine was then manufactured, and over forty-five-million peo-
ple were inoculated. No new cases of swine flu occurred, but it was
found that the vaccine caused or promoted Guillian-Barre syndrome,
93. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 6, at 1399.
94. With regard to the seven vaccines commonly administered to children in the
United States, statistics indicate that "based on a population of 3.5 million children re-
ceiving the DPT vaccine annually, an average of fifty suffer permanent brain damage,
nine thousand collapse after DPT inoculation [and] 25,000 suffer very high fevers. An
average of eight contract polio from the oral polio vaccine. About forty to sixty chil-
dren go into shock after receiving the vaccine against mumps, measles and rubella or
DPT". Sun, The Vexing Problems of Vaccine Compensation, 227 SCIENCE 1017 (1985)
(citing testimony of Edward Brandt, Jr., then Assistant Secretary of Health at the De-
partment of Health and Human Services).
95. See Dark, supra note 91, at 834-35. See also, Reitze, Federal Compensation for
Vaccination Induced Injuries, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 169, 169 (1986).
96. During 1918 and 1919, 20 million people died from swine flu worldwide, includ-
ing 500,000 people in the United States. Reitze, supra note 95, at 170.
97. See Dark, supra note 91, at 835. For a general discussion of the governmental
policy behind the program, see NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR (1978).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 247 (1976). See also Rheingold & Shoemaker, The Swine Flu Liti-
gation, 8 LITIGATION 28, 28 (1981).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(3) (1978).
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a disabling neurological disorder.OO As a result, the immunization
program was quickly halted. Thousands of claims were subsequently
filed, and the Government has paid out nearly 80 million dollars in
damages.' 0 ' It has been argued that without federal intervention, the
amount awarded would have been substantially greater.10 2 In light of
the potential for liability demonstrated by the swine flu episode, it is
hardly surprising that manufacturers are reluctant to place new vac-
cines on the market.
V. THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT AND THE
REVITALIZATION OF THE AMERICAN VACCINE INDUSTRY
Recognizing that the supply of certain vaccines in the United
States was in serious jeopardy, Congress passed the National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Act in November of 1986 (the "Act"). 03 The
Act was designed to protect vaccine manufacturers from strict liabil-
ity for injuries due to the unavoidable risks of their products.'0 4 It
established a no-fault federal program for compensating individuals
injured as the result of having received one of the seven compulsory
childhood vaccines.
Section 300aa-14 of the Act provides a "Vaccine Injury Table"
which contains a list of injuries that have been associated with the
administration of different vaccines and a time period within which
adverse effects would be expected to appear. A petitioner is permit-
ted to recover damages if he can establish that he developed one of
the listed injuries within the stipulated time.105 He need not show
negligence or establish causation.106 If a claimant chooses to accept
the damages provided under the Act, he is then barred from bringing
a civil action against the manufacturers. 0 7
However, protection of manufacturers by the Act is not absolute.
If a claimant is unsatisfied with the statutory award, he may still at-
tempt to recover from the vaccine manufacturer under state tort or
contract law.108 Thus, Congress has carefully preserved traditional
100. See Huber, supra note 7.
101. Id
102. See Dark, supra note 91, at 837.
103. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -33 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4-5 (1986).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (1989).
105. Id
106. Id
107. Id. at § 300aa-21(a).
108. Id. at § 300aa-21(b).
state authority in compensating citizens injured by defective prod-
ucts.109 Moreover, the Act only applies to injuries caused by the una-
voidable risks of vaccines; manufacturers remain liable for their
negligence. The crucial question is: What standard will be used to de-
termine whether or not a manufacturer has exercised due care?
Congress recognized the role that the lack of a national standard
for negligence played in the abandonment of vaccines by manufactur-
ers. In response, a new standard was established with the intent to
preempt state law. In so doing, it limited the liability of manufactur-
ers in three important ways. First, under section 300aa-22(b) of the
Act, a manufacturer does not have a duty to provide direct warnings
to patients receiving vaccines."i 0 In effect, this provision overrules
Givens and re-establishes the "learned intermediary" principle.
Second, the Act provides for a limited preemption of state law by
FDA regulations. A manufacturer will not be held liable if he can
show that he has complied with all of the requirements of the Fed-
eral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and Section 351 of the Public
Health Service Act."1 ' In this way, Congress has preempted the use
of state regulations as a means for establishing negligence without
preempting either state regulations themselves or state common
law. 1 2 The provision asserts that vaccines properly belong under the
comment k exception to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and establishes an objective standard for what constitutes due
care on the part of manufacturers.
Finally, the Act states that a claimant cannot recover punitive
damages from a manufacturer absent a showing of fraud or inten-
tional misconduct.113
The effectiveness of the Act has yet to be evaluated. While on its
face it appears to shield manufacturers from the worst aspects of lia-
bility, how much protection it will provide in practice has been ques-
tioned. Huber has argued that the provision excusing manufacturers
from the "unavoidable side effects" of their product is unacceptably
vague. 1 4 Courts desiring to compensate vaccine victims can easily
point to procedures and products used in other countries to show that
an injury was not truly "unavoidable." In addition, the relative ease
109. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Abbot v. American Cy-
anamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988); Rinehart v. International Platex, Inc., 688 F.
Supp. 475 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan.
1987); MacGillivary v. Lederle Laboratories, 667 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.M. 1987).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b) (1989).
111. Id
112. Even though state regulations cannot be used as a measure of negligence,
states are not prohibited from enacting regulations setting different standards from
those set forth by the FDA or using them in other ways. For example, states could
fine manufacturers for noncompliance.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-23 (1989).
114. Huber, supra note 7, at 9.
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with which compensation can be obtained under the Act may lead to
such a proliferation of frivolous claims and awards that the federal
compensation system will collapse. 115
A final limitation of the Act is that it applies only to the seven
compulsory childhood vaccines presently on the market. It does not
apply to vaccines used predominantly by adults (e.g., the vaccine for
hepatitis) or to noncompulsory vaccines administered to children
(e.g., vaccines for meningitis). 116 Moreover, it does nothing to en-
courage corporations to develop new vaccines. Why, for example,
should a corporation develop a vaccine for AIDS? Development and
testing of such a product will require years of research and millions
of dollars; the market will probably be limited to a small subgroup of
the adult population; and there is no protection from potentially cata-
strophic lawsuits.117 Until legislation is passed that offers a corpora-
tion some degree of protection for new vaccines, it is unlikely that
companies will make substantial investments in the development or
manufacture of such products.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. State Compensation of Those Injured by Compulsory Vaccines
It is an unfortunate fact of medicine that even the most beneficial
of drugs and treatments often carry with them a substantial capacity
for harm. Vaccines have prevented the suffering of countless people
throughout the world, but in so doing they have occasionally caused
the very disease which they were designed to prevent. State govern-
ments have balanced the benefits and harms of vaccines and have, in
certain instances, determined that it is in the community's interest to
make their administration mandatory. Since the state has compelled
citizens to assume the risk of vaccination and since the entire state
benefits, it seems incumbent upon society as a whole to provide com-
pensation to those injured as a result of the program."18
115. Id.
116. New Hepatitis Vaccine Developed, 11 NEW SCIENTIST 419 (1983) (announcing
the development of a new, safe and inexpensive hepatitis vaccine); R. OuELLETrE AND
P. CHEREMISINOFF, APPLICATIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 108-13 (1985) (discussing vac-
cines against diseases of man and animals).
117. See Cooper, The Maker of AIDS Vaccine Will Need Protection from Product
Liability Suits, MANHATTAN LAW, June 14, 1988, at 38.
118. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 539 (1990).
B. State Compensation of Those Injured by Noncompulsory
Vaccines
Where vaccine administration is not compulsory, the responsibility
of the state to compensate victims is less clear. It can be argued that
where individuals have been adequately appraised of the dangers of
vaccination, they assume the risk of injury by permitting themselves
to be inoculated.
This argument ignores the fact that society benefits in the same
way from noncompulsory as from compulsory vaccines. The differ-
ence lies not in the nature of benefits derived, but in whether the dis-
ease for which the vaccine is administered is so common as to
warrant mandatory vaccination. Society benefits by keeping people
healthy and avoiding the cost of healing its injured members. The
government can encourage people to be vaccinated by providing that
if they are injured, it will compensate them directly for their loss. To
write off vaccination victims as losers in a kind of health care lottery
is both unrealistic and uncompassionate.
C. Alternative Considerations
Much of this paper has been devoted to describing how and why
the imposition of certain judicial interpretations of strict liability,
coupled with the threat of punitive damages, have driven most vac-
cine producers to withdraw from the market. On the other hand, the
attitude of manufacturers is difficult to understand. While it is true
that a few courts have been highly deferential to plaintiffs, most have
followed comment k and have held manufacturers to a standard of
negligence.119
Even prior to the adoption of the National Childhood Vaccine In-
jury Act, a number of states passed legislation limiting punitive dam-
ages awards12 0 and allowed manufacturers to avoid liability entirely
if they could demonstrate that they had fully complied with FDA
regulations.121 It seems that manufacturers should be able to ade-
quately protect themselves against products liability losses either by
adjusting their prices or by refusing to sell their products in the few
119. See, e.g., Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr.
322 (1963). See also Annotation, Products Liability: Pertussis Vaccine Manufacturers,
57 A.L.R.4TH 911 (1987); Annotation, Liability of Manufacturers of Oral Live Polio
(Sabin) Vaccine for Injury or Death From its Administration, 66 A.L.R.4TH 83 (1988).
120. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(b) (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1987);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 41.001-.009 (Vernon Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-38.1 (1987).
121. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58c-5(c)
(West 1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80 (Anderson Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.927 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (Supp. 1990).
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jurisdictions where court rulings have been unfavorable.122
One suspects that the real fear vaccine manufacturers share ex-
tends beyond the mere possibility of liability for unavoidable injuries
or even an occasional punitive damages award. Their flight from the
vaccine market may reflect, in large measure, a fear that they are not
able to adequately guard against negligence or cope with the conse-
quences that might ensue. Suppose, for example, that a batch of
DPT vaccine became contaminated with a pathogenic agent which
went undetected. By the time the mistake was discovered, the vac-
cine might well have been administered to thousands of children.
Under these circumstances, the company that made the vaccine
would be fully liable in all jurisdictions. The consequences for both
the children and the company could be catastrophic.
While the manufacturers' fear of such risk is understandable, it is
precisely this fear of liability that tort law relies upon to reduce the
likelihood of disasters by promoting prudent behavior.123 Arguably,
the tort system has ensured that vaccine producers will take ade-
quate, perhaps even extreme, measures to ensure that their products
are made as safe as possible. Unfortunately, this method of encour-
aging super-safe behavior is driving most manufactureers out of the
market and making the development of new vaccines a highly unat-
tractive proposition.
Congress has attempted to prevent the total collapse of the Ameri-
can vaccine industry by enacting the National Childhood Vaccine In-
jury Act. Unfortunately, this Act does nothing to protect
manufacturers from the potentially catastrophic consequences of neg-
ligence or to encourage them to develop new products. Although the
Act may serve to maintain the present supply of vaccines used in
compulsory childhood immunization programs, as a tool for revital-
izing the vaccine industry in the United States, it will almost surely
fail.
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The judicial and legislative programs may be able to accomplish to-
gether what neither has been able to accomplish alone. One way to
fulfill the needs of both manufacturers and the public would be for
122. There is some precedent for such action. A Japanese manufacturer of a vac-
cine for an Asian form of encephalitis withdrew the product from the U.S. market cit-
ing concerns over potential products liability lawsuits. See Hill & Pearson, Health
Advice for International Travel, 108 ANN. INTERN. MED. 839 (1988).
123. Hager, supra note 118.
the federal government to establish a program for testing lots of vac-
cine before they are distributed for public innoculation. Funding for
such a program could come from the vaccine manufacturers and, in
exchange, the government could grant manufacturers immunity from
lawsuits by private individuals. Since the risk to manufactureers
would be substantially reduced, their insurance costs, presently ac-
counting for the majority of the price of vaccines, should be corre-
spondingly reduced. 2 4 Thus, it may be possible to fund such a
program without a resulting increase in the price of vaccines.
The government could impose its own penalties to insure mainte-
nance of high production standards by imposing fines for contami-
nated vaccines. In addition, the government could reserve for itself
the right to sue manufacturers for fraud or intentional misconduct.
Thus, the liability of manufacturers would still be great enough to
promote caution, but the danger of an entire corporate bankruptcy
resulting from a single bad batch of product would be eliminated.
The liability of the government could be limited by setting a cap on
the amount of compensation available for different types of injury
and by eliminating punitive damages awards entirely.125 In effect,
the government would be assuming the role of the manufacturers' in-
surer, but would face less risk by providing an extra layer of testing
prior to the release of vaccines.
One advantage of such a system is that it could readily be applied
to new products. Thus, manufacturers could develop vaccines know-
ing that a mechanism existed for bringing them to market without
risking the survival of the corporation. This is of great importance.
Vaccines offer tremendous potential in the treatment of AIDS, some
forms of cancer (particularly melanomas), venereal disease and a
host of afflictions common in other parts of the world.126 It will be
tragic if these products are never developed because of legal
obstacles.
124. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
125. In this respect, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act can serve as a
model. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-23 (1989).
126. R. OULLE=rE & P. CHEREMISINOFF, supra note 116, at 108-13.
